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In a federal state, transfers from the central government to lower-tier administrative units
are a crucial ingredient both for the eﬃcient provision of public goods and services, and
for the competition between political actors. A large body of research in public ﬁnance
has investigated the normative justiﬁcations of transfers (e.g., see Oates, 1972). From a
political economy perspective, however, it is hard to believe that central governments—
because of either their own preferences or institutional and political constraints—behave
as a benevolent social planner would do, that is, using conditional matching grants to
internalize externalities or intergovernmental transfers for redistributive purposes. Indeed,
although federations usually adopt allocation rules that shelter the distribution of transfers
from political distortions, incumbent politicians have a lot of discretion in using them to
tease swing voters, reward core supporters, or build alliances with other politicians. In
other words, using Cox’s (2009) taxonomy, real-world distributive politics might respond
to the vote-producing goals of persuasion of unattached voters, mobilization of attached
voters, or coordination among political parties.
In this paper, we apply a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in close electoral
races to disclose utterly political reasons behind the allocation of central transfers to local
governments in Brazil. In particular, we identify the impact of political alignment between
the mayor and the Brazilian President on the amount of federal transfers to municipalities.
The intuition behind our identiﬁcation strategy is simple. If random factors—for example,
unexpected breaking news or rain on election day—played even a small role in deciding
electoral outcomes, the victory of the mayoral candidate aligned with the President would
mimic random assignment in those municipal elections decided by a narrow margin. The
RDD setup therefore delivers a (local) source of exogenous variation in political alignment.
Consistently with the Brazilian multi-party system, we measure political alignment with
respect to both the government coalition and the political party of the President.
The theoretical literature has provided contrasting explanations for politically moti-
vated transfers, or tactical redistribution.1 On the one hand, incumbent politicians may
use intergovernmental transfers to increase their (or their allies’) reelection probability at
1See Cox (2009) for a survey on the political economy of distributive politics.
1the central and local level, therefore allocating larger transfers to localities where swing vot-
ers are overrepresented (see Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1998). On
the other hand, politicians may decide to use transfers to reward their core supporters (see
Cox and McCubbins, 1986).2 Irrespective of the degree of political competition, however,
as far as local governments can claim some political credit for the resources they receive
from the central government, the alignment between the two layers of government—that
is, whether they belong to the same political coalition or not—is expected to increase the
amount of transfers, because the central government has an incentive to favor its (political)
friends and penalize its (political) enemies.
Testing the above hypothesis has proven to be a diﬃcult endeavor. Without a credi-
ble source of exogenous variation in political alignment, the empirical correlation between
alignment and larger transfers (if any) could be completely driven by (local) socio-economic
conditions aﬀecting both electoral outcomes and the allocation of government revenues.
Most of the early studies have tackled this issue with a “selection on observables” as-
sumption, controlling for diﬀerent measures of the normative and political determinants
of transfers. In the U.S., Grossman (1994) ﬁnds that the similarity of party aﬃliation
between federal and state politicians increases grants made to a state; Levitt and Sny-
der (1995) show that the share of democratic voters is an important predictor of federal
transfers to a district, especially in years of democratic control in Congress. In Australia,
Worthington and Dollery (1998) also detect some tactical distribution of grants. This
approach, however, is likely to suﬀer from a problem of omitted bias.
Recent studies have improved upon the earlier literature by using panel estimators.
Sol´ e-Oll´ e and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) use data on Spain and implement a diﬀ-in-diﬀ strat-
egy, both across time (exploiting the within-municipality variation in political alignment
induced by subsequent elections) and across grantors (exploiting the within-municipality
variation in political alignment with diﬀerent layers of government). They ﬁnd that mu-
nicipalities aligned with the two upper-tier governments receive over 40% more grants than
2The “swing voters” hypothesis with respect to intergovernmental grants has received empirical support
for Albania (Case, 2001) and Sweden (Johansson, 2003). Looking at diﬀerent outcomes, the share of
unaligned voters has been shown to be positively correlated with presidential campaigning in the US
(Stromberg, 2008) and the quality of politicians in Italy (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011). On the contrary,
Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa (2006) ﬁnd support for the “core supporters” hypothesis in the allocation of
the U.S. federal budget, as states that heavily supported the President receive more funds.
2unaligned municipalities. Other studies control for (time-invariant) confounding factors
in a ﬁxed-eﬀect framework. In India, Arulampalam et al. (2009) ﬁnd that aligned states
receive larger grants, especially if they are swing states. Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa (2006)
study the allocation of the U.S. federal budget and show that states whose governors be-
long to the same party of the President receive more funds. Also for the U.S., Berry,
Burden, and Howell (2010) use a large panel data set of federal outlays and show that
districts and counties receive more money when their legislators are aligned with the fed-
eral President. In Portugal, Veiga and Pinho (2007) ﬁnd evidence of distortions favoring
municipalities ruled by the Prime Minister’s party during the early years of democracy,
but not in the period of established democracy.
Yet, unobservable confounding factors might be time-varying as well. For example,
the occurrence of an international economic crisis could swing a large fraction of voters in
export-oriented regions toward a given political party, and at the central level the same
party could decide to favor these regions because of its policy preferences rather than
tactical motivations. In this respect, our econometric strategy improves internal validity,
because it accommodates for both time-invariant and time-varying confounding factors.
The close-election RDD setup not only has a comparative advantage in internal validity,
but also addresses another relevant question, namely the interaction between the degree of
competition and political alignment in shaping the tactical allocation of federal transfers.
By contrasting close versus safe electoral races, we can shed light on how the eﬀect of
alignment varies along this dimension. The only limitation of this setup is that, in order
to ensure internal validity in the Brazilian multi-party system, we must restrict the sample
to elections where there are two (or at most three) candidates, and one of them is aﬃliated
with the coalition or party of the President. Although this restriction only aﬀects external
validity, we show that benchmark estimations with OLS and diﬀ-in-diﬀ deliver the same
results both in the all sample and in our two-candidate (or three-candidate) races.
To obtain a better understanding of the (reduced-form) RDD results, we frame the
above issues into a simple model, where the central government allocates transfers to
local governments in order to maximize both the citizens’ goodwill toward itself and the
political capital represented by aligned mayors, who are inﬂuential opinion leaders at the
local level and may turn to be important supporters at the next federal election. If the
3central government were able to obtain full political credit for the transfers, it would
only care about the citizens’ goodwill and would be indiﬀerent between beneﬁting aligned
versus unaligned mayors. On the contrary, if voters were partly unable to distinguish
the source of municipal revenues and there were some political credit spillovers in favor
of local governments, aligned municipalities should end up receiving more transfers, as
the central government would try either to help aligned mayors to get reelected or to
hamper the reelection prospects of unaligned mayors.3 Among aligned municipalities,
those where the incumbent won by a narrow margin should receive more, because it is
especially there that larger municipal revenues can make a diﬀerence in the next election.
By the same token, among unaligned municipalities, those where the incumbent won by a
narrow margin should receive less, because the federal government wants to tie the hands
of its political enemies. Furthermore, all of these eﬀects should be stronger where (i) the
impact of transfers on reelection is higher (for instance, where the mayor faces no term
limit and puts more eﬀort in the campaign), and (ii) the value of political capital is higher
(for instance, where local politicians have a stronger inﬂuence on the public opinion).
The close-race RDD setup is particularly suited to test the theoretical predictions.
According to our empirical results, in races decided by a narrow margin, municipalities
where the mayor is aﬃliated with the political coalition of the Brazilian President receive
larger (discretionary) transfers in infrastructure by about one-third in the last two years of
the mayoral mandate, that is, when the next municipal elections are approaching. During
the ﬁrst two years of the mandate, when instead federal elections are approaching, we ﬁnd
no evidence of political distortions in the allocation of federal transfers. This is consis-
tent with the hypothesis of political credit spillovers mentioned above, as it seems that
opportunistic transfers take place in proximity of municipal rather than federal elections.
Consistently with our model, the eﬀect of political alignment is driven by a sizable cut in
transfers to unaligned municipalities close to the discontinuity of zero margin of victory. In
other words, there is evidence that the federal government penalizes municipalities ruled
by mayors who belong to the opposition coalition and won by a narrow margin (the “tying
hands” eﬀect). On the other side of the discontinuity, however, we ﬁnd no evidence that
3On contested credit claiming in distributive politics, see Shepsle et al. (2009), who show that the mem-
bers of the U.S. House and Senate delegations within each state must share the credit for appropriations
that originate in their chamber with the delegation members in the other chamber.
4the federal government mostly targets those aligned municipalities where the mayor won
by a narrow margin; on the contrary, the political strongholds of the President’s coalition
tend to receive larger transfers. Political alignment has also a positive impact on the
incumbent mayor’s reelection probability and on the President’s vote share in the future
federal election, although these results are less robust and more volatile.
The eﬀect of political alignment on federal transfers is heterogeneous along the lines
predicted by our theoretical framework. First, the eﬀect of political alignment is higher
(i) in municipalities without a local radio station, and (ii) in small municipalities. We
interpret this as evidence that the impact of alignment is higher if the value of political
capital for the central government is larger (for instance, where municipal institutions
are important opinion leaders and the main source of political information for citizens).
Second, the eﬀect is higher (i) for mayors without a binding term limit, (ii) for mayors
who are not aligned with the state governor, and (iii) for municipalities characterized by
high turnout rates. We interpret these ﬁndings as evidence that the impact of alignment
is magniﬁed by how eﬀective transfers are in producing votes (for instance, because the
incumbent mayor exerts more eﬀort in getting reelected or has a hard time obtaining
transfers from other sources, such as the state government).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our
theoretical framework. In particular, in Section 2.1 we introduce a simple model setting
the stage for the empirical analysis; in Section 2.2 we derive our identiﬁcation strategy. In
Section 3, we discuss the relevant Brazilian institutions and describe our data. In Section
4, we present the empirical results and validity tests. We conclude with Section 5.
2 Theoretical Preliminaries
2.1 A simple model
Consider the (political) maximization problem of a central government (or President)
that must choose the amount of federal transfers τi to allocate to each local government
i, with i = 1,...,N. The President’s objective function is made up of two (political)
beneﬁts. On the one hand, he will try to increase the general goodwill of the citizens in
every municipality i toward the central government; and this is assumed to be a positive
5function of the amount of transferred resources: U(τi), with U0 > 0,U00 < 0. On the other
hand, he will try to increase the likelihood that municipality i is run by a mayor aligned
with the central government, either because local politicians are important opinion leaders
and they may turn to be useful allies in the next presidential campaign, or because they
may engage in rent-seeking activities for the President. If the future margin of victory of
the mayoral candidate aligned with the President is positive (that is, if the President’s
coalition wins in municipality i), the central government increases its political capital by
a positive (ﬁxed) amount R. The relative weight of the two beneﬁts, however, depends
on whether voters give political credit for the increased municipal revenues to the central
government or to the mayor. We deﬁne θ ∈ [0,1] as the political credit spillovers accruing
to the incumbent mayor. In other words, if θ = 0 the central government can claim full
credit for τi, while if θ = 1 all the credit is going to the municipal government.
















where MV Pi is the future margin of victory of the mayoral candidate aligned with the
central government in municipality i, and C(τi) captures the opportunity cost of allocating
a certain amount of transfers, with C0 > 0,C00 < 0. We assume the cost function of
municipality i to be independent of what happens in municipality j 6= i. This is in line
with the Brazilian institutions that we describe below, because the discretionary transfers
of our empirical analysis are a very small fraction of the federal budget. In other words,
the central government could easily meet the requests of every municipality independently
of each other, but meeting each individual request comes with an opportunity cost C(τi),
either in terms of taxation or decreased expenditure on other items of the budget. From an
econometric point of view, this is equivalent to assuming that the Stable Unit Treatment
Value Assumption (SUTVA) holds, as the outcome (federal transfers) of i depends on the
treatment (political alignment) of i but not on the treatment of j 6= i.
The crucial point is that—in equation (1)—the margin of victory of the aligned can-
didate in municipality i is going to be aﬀected by federal transfers too. In particular, we
assume that the transferred resources are going to increase the electoral prospects of the
incumbent mayor, or of his political party. Therefore, if the incumbent is aligned with the
6President (Pi = 1), τi will increase the future margin of victory of the politically aligned
candidate, and vice versa if the incumbent is not aligned (Pi = 0). The future margin of
victory of the aligned candidate can be expressed as:
MV Pi = ρMV P
0
i + i + θ(2Pi − 1)f(τi), (2)
where MV P 0
i is the margin of victory of the aligned candidate in the previous election,
 ∼ N(0,σ2) is a normally distributed random shock, and f(τi) is a function that translates
transfers into votes for the incumbent, with f0 > 0,f00 < 0.
The persistence of the past margin of victory (captured by ρ) means that the future
electoral outcome depends on the past electoral outcome, either because of the ideological
bias of voters in municipality i or because of an incumbency advantage. The normal shock
i accommodates for the presence of random events.4 The last term on the right-hand side
of equation (2) captures the impact of transfers on the next municipal election. As long
as there are some political credit spillovers (θ > 0), the additional municipal revenues are
going to help either the aligned candidate if Pi = 1, or the unaligned candidate if Pi = 0.5
Indeed, the assumption that higher transfers from the central government increase the
reelection probability of the incumbent mayor or party has been corroborated by many
empirical studies, also on Brazil.6 It follows that:
Pr[MV Pi > 0] = Φ

ρMV P 0




where Φ[.] is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.
4The normality assumption simpliﬁes notation, but it is not required by Proposition 1 below; Propo-
sition 2 only requires a random shock distributed with a decreasing density on either side of zero.
5We are implicitly assuming that the impact of more municipal resources on electoral outcomes is the
same for aligned and unaligned incumbents. This simpliﬁes notation and introduces symmetry, but it
comes with no loss of generality with respect to the propositions derived below.
6For Brazil, Brollo et al. (2010) and Litschig and Morrison (2010) apply an RDD in population size to
estimate the impact of larger transfers on the incumbent mayor’s reelection; both studies detect a positive
eﬀect in diﬀerent sample periods; Brollo (2008) ﬁnds that the federal government reduces transfers to
corrupt municipalities, but it helps its (political) friends to get rid of the punishment faster; Caselli and
Michaels (2009) and Monteiro and Ferraz (2010) ﬁnd that oil windfalls are associated with a positive
incumbency advantage at the municipal level. For Uruguay, Manacorda et al. (2009) apply an RDD in
the assignment criterion of an anti-poverty program and ﬁnd a positive impact on the recipients’ support
for the government. For Spain, Sol´ e-Oll´ e and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) ﬁnd that grants allocated to local
governments of the same party buy more political support than the others.
7Equilibrium transfers. Substituting the last expression into equation (1), the ﬁrst-












0(τi) = 0, (4)
where φ[.] is the density function of the standard normal. Also note that, by deﬁnition,
Pi = 1 if MV P 0
i > 0, and Pi = 0 if MV P 0
i < 0.
From this simple ﬁrst-order condition, we can derive a set of testable predictions on the
direction and size of politically motivated central transfers. Assume that the past margin
of victory tends to either +∞ or −∞, or that there are no political credit spillovers
(θ = 0): in both cases, transfers do not inﬂuence the future margin of victory. As a result,
the central government simply weighs the marginal beneﬁt of increasing citizens’ goodwill
against the marginal cost of τi: this gives the (politically) optimal amount of transfers τ∗
in absence of tactical redistribution, such that (1 − θ)U0(τ∗
i ) = C0(τ∗
i ).
Things change, of course, if θ > 0 and MV P 0
i ∈ [−1,1]. In this case, the central
government chooses τi by looking at the additional marginal beneﬁt or cost of inﬂuencing
the next municipal election. Indeed, from equation (4), it is evident that the second term
in the left-hand side is either positive if Pi = 1 or negative if Pi = 0. In other words, at
the zero threshold (MV P 0
i = 0), there is a sharp jump in the maximization problem of
the President, as the marginal cost of sending money to an unaligned incumbent suddenly
becomes the marginal beneﬁt of sending money to an aligned incumbent. This implies a
strong and positive impact of political alignment on transfers in close electoral races.
Proposition 1 The (local) Average Treatment Eﬀect (ATE) of political alignment on
transfers is positive at MV P 0
i = 0. That is: lim
MV P0
i ↓0 τi − lim
MV P0
i ↑0 τi > 0.7
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that—given the model’s assumptions and
the second-order condition of the President’s maximization problem—politically motivated
transfers are a decreasing function of the past margin of victory of the aligned candidate
on both sides of the zero threshold. In fact, ∂τi/∂MV P 0
i < 0 both if Pi = 1 and if Pi = 0.
The intuition for this result is simple and follows from the persistence of the electoral
outcome: on the left of the zero threshold (MV P 0
i < 0), the central government wants
7The proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward, but for completeness we sketch it in the Appendix.
8to penalize unaligned municipalities lost by a narrow margin, because especially there
transfers are going to make a diﬀerence in the next election; by the same token, on the
right of the zero threshold (MV P 0
i > 0), the central government wants to favor aligned
municipalities won by a narrow margin.
Proposition 2 The amount of politically motivated transfers is a decreasing function of
MV P 0
i on either side of the threshold MV P 0
i = 0. That is: ∂τi/∂MV P 0
i < 0.8
These theoretical results are graphically shown in Figure 1, where the optimal amount
of politically motivated transfers to municipality i is expressed as a function of the past
margin of victory. There, the dashed horizontal line represents τ∗, while the solid lines
on the two sides of the zero threshold are the optimal transfers decided by the central
government on the basis of the ex-ante level of political competition in unaligned (on the
left of zero) versus aligned (on the right of zero) municipalities. The sharp jump at zero
is the local treatment eﬀect of political alignment in close elections.
Comparative statics. The theoretical framework also delivers predictions of compar-
ative statics. In particular, the size of the causal impact of political alignment on transfers
in close elections depends on the model’s parameters. The ATE at MV P 0
i = 0 increases
if the value of political capital (R) increases. In fact, by the implicit function theorem:
∂τi/∂R > 0 if Pi = 1; and ∂τi/∂R < 0 if Pi = 0. This means that in Figure 1, as R
increases, the curve on the right of zero shifts upward and the curve on the left of zero
shifts downward, thereby increasing the jump in optimal transfers at MV P 0
i = 0. By the
same token, it is easy to see that the ATE increases if the variance of the random shock
(σ2) decreases. In fact, in this case: ∂τi/∂σ < 0 if Pi = 1; ∂τi/∂σ > 0 if Pi = 0. By a
slight abuse of notation, we could also state that the ATE increases if the marginal impact
of transfers on votes (f0(τi)) increases. Assuming f(.) to be linear, for instance, would
deliver the same comparative statics result obtained on R for the political eﬀectiveness of
transfers. The impact of political credit spillovers—as captured by θ—is instead unclear,
because the relationship between θ and the optimal τ turns out to be ambiguous.
8To obtain interior solutions, we are implicitly assuming that the ﬁrst-order condition in equation
(4)—evaluated at Pi = 0, τ = 0, and MV P0
i = 0—is strictly positive. The proof of Proposition 2 easily
follows from the implicit function theorem and is sketched in the Appendix.
92.2 Identiﬁcation and estimation
The close-race RDD setup (see Lee, 2008) is particularly suited to take the above the-
oretical predictions to the data and estimate the causal eﬀect of political alignment on
the amount of (discretionary) federal transfers. Deﬁne τim(1) as the potential transfers
received by municipality i during the administrative mandate m if the mayor is politically
aligned with the President, and τim(0) as the potential transfers of the same municipality
if the mayor is not aligned with the President. The variable Pim deﬁnes the treatment
status: Pim = 1 if there is political alignment, and Pim = 0 otherwise. The observed
outcome is thus: τim = Pim · τim(1) + (1 − Pim) · τim(0). The estimand of interest is the
ATE, E[τim(1) − τim(0)], deﬁned over some subpopulation of interest.
Deﬁne Wi as a set of relevant municipality-speciﬁc covariates (including state ﬁxed
eﬀects), Xim as a set of (mandate-varying) mayoral characteristics, and δm as mandate
ﬁxed eﬀects. In the OLS estimation




imφ + δm + εim, (5)
the estimated ˆ π is based on the conditional comparison of the observed transfers of aligned
versus unaligned municipalities, which does not generally provide an unbiased estimate
of the ATE, as long as towns with diﬀerent unobservable characteristics aﬀecting federal
transfers self-select into political alignment by voting for diﬀerent parties.
A diﬀ-in-diﬀ estimator can instead control for time-invariant confounding factors by
means of municipality ﬁxed eﬀects γi:
τim = α + πPim + X
0
imφ + γi + δm + εim. (6)
Also in this estimation, however, ˆ π might fall short of providing an unbiased estimate of
the ATE. In particular, unobservable confounding factors might be time-varying too.
In order to deal with the presence of both time-invariant and time-varying confounding
factors, we implement an RDD strategy in the spirit of Lee (2008) and compare munici-
palities where the politically aligned candidate barely won with municipalities where the
politically aligned candidate barely lost.9 Speciﬁcally, we calculate the margin of victory
9See also Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004). Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2008)
use the same identiﬁcation strategy to estimate the impact of political parties with diﬀerent ideologies on
10of the mayoral candidate politically aligned with the Brazilian President in each munici-
pality i and mandate m (MV Pim).10 This measure is thus positive in municipalities where
the mayor belongs to the central government coalition, and negative otherwise. At the
zero threshold, MV Pim = 0, political alignment Pim sharply changes from zero to one.
This treatment assignment mechanism is an example of sharp RDD and delivers a direct
test of Proposition 1 in our theoretical framework.
MV Pim can be seen as a random variable depending on observable and unobserv-
able variables, as well as on random events on election day (the shock i in our model).
Lee (2008) shows that identiﬁcation requires that: (i) for each political candidate, the
probability of winning is never equal to zero or one; (ii) for each political candidate, the
probabilities of winning or losing the election by a narrow margin are identical.11 In other
words, electoral outcomes depend on both predictable elements and random chance, but
the latter is crucial only when the race is close. The ATE in close elections is thus:
E[τim(1) − τim(0)|MV Pim = 0] = lim
↓0
E[τim|MV Pim = ] − lim
↑0
E[τim|MV Pim = ]. (7)
Equation (7) expresses a local eﬀect, which cannot be extrapolated to the whole population
without additional homogeneity assumptions.12
Various methods can be used to estimate the local ATE expressed in equation (7).
We ﬁrst apply a spline polynomial approximation, that is, we ﬁt a p-order polynomial in
policy outcomes in the U.S. and Sweden, respectively. Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011)
use a close-election RDD strategy to estimate the impact of majoritarian versus proportional elections on
targeted redistribution and rent extraction.
10This corresponds to MV P0
i in the theoretical model; we omit the superscript for the sake of simple
notation. We use two diﬀerent measures of political alignment according to either the government coalition
or the political party of the President; see Section 3.3 for more details.
11These conditions are equivalent to the standard RDD assumption that potential outcomes must be a
continuous function of the running variable at the threshold (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001).
12This eﬀect, however, is exactly what Proposition 1 predicts. Note that the fact that our model predicts
that the central government can use transfers to target electoral races decided by a narrow margin does not
violate the RDD identiﬁcation assumptions. In fact, in the real world, there are two possible responses to
this strategy. First, the opposition coalition might reply by targeting the same races with its own political
instruments (e.g., campaigning time and money); in this case, from one election to the next, the level
of political competition would change only because of random shocks. Second, the opposition coalition
might be constrained in its political instruments; in this case, the central government could shift the past
close races in its favor, but, still, there will be some other races decided by a narrow margin at the next
electoral cycle. Indeed, ex-post close races are diﬀerent from ex-ante close races and this ensures that the
(local) assignment into treatment is as good as random.











im) + δm + vs + ηim, (8)
where δm are mandate ﬁxed eﬀects, and vs state ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimated coeﬃcient ˆ π0
identiﬁes the ATE at the zero threshold, and we expect ˆ π0 > 0 to validate Proposition 1.
Standard OLS inference procedures can be applied; we also cluster standard errors at the
town level, because the same municipality may be observed in repeated mayoral terms.
An additional advantage of equation (8) is that the shape of the polynomial on the left
of zero (i.e., the estimated coeﬃcients ˆ ρk) and of the polynomial on the right of zero (i.e.,
the estimated coeﬃcients ˆ πk) can indirectly test Proposition 2, that is, they can tell us
something on the relationship between the level of political competition and discretionary
transfers to the President’s (political) friends or enemies. Because the assignment to
political alignment is endogenous as we move far away from zero, however, this evidence
ought to be interpreted with caution.
The above spline polynomial estimation is attractive for many reasons, although a
possible concern is that it may be sensitive to outcome values for observations far away
from the threshold (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). To control for this, we also apply
the local linear regression approach, which restricts the sample to municipalities in the
interval MV Pim ∈ [−h,+h] and estimates the model:
τim = ρ0 + ρ1MV Pim + π0Pim + π1Pim · MV Pim + δm + vs + ηim, (9)
where δm are mandate ﬁxed eﬀects, vs state ﬁxed eﬀects, standard errors are clustered at
the town level, and the optimal bandwidth h is selected as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2009). Again, ˆ π0 identiﬁes the ATE at the zero threshold.
Finally, to evaluate the comparative statics of our model, we check for treatment eﬀect
heterogeneity in separate subsamples. The intuition for this test is simple. Assume that
Dim captures a given heterogeneity dimension, which can be interpreted as a good proxy

























+ δm + vs + ξim.
(10)
12As a result, ˆ π0 identiﬁes the treatment eﬀect in Dim = 0, ˆ π0 + ˆ β0 in Dim = 1, and ˆ β0
the diﬀerence between the two. If Dim measures the importance of political capital for
the central government, we expect ˆ β0 > 0. Similarly, if Dim measures the eﬀectiveness of
additional revenues in terms of the electoral outcome, we expect ˆ β0 > 0.
3 Institutions and Data
3.1 The Brazilian federal system
Brazilian politics takes place in the framework of a federal presidential democracy and of a
multi-party system. The Brazilian territory is divided in 26 states and one federal district
(Brasilia), ruled by a governor and a legislative assembly. Municipalities are the lowest
layer of administrative division, and are ruled by an elected mayor (Prefeito) and by an
elected city council (Camera dos Vereadores). Municipal governments are in charge of a
relevant share of the provision of public goods and services related to education, health, and
infrastructure projects. President, governors, and mayors of municipalities above 200,000
voters are directly elected with (runoﬀ) majority rule, while mayors of municipalities
below 200,000 are directly elected with plurality rule. Deputies and senators are elected
with open-list proportional representation, and the same holds for state deputies and city
councillors. The elections of the President, governors, and members of Congress all take
place at the same time every four years, while municipal elections are staggered by two
years and also take place every four years.
The Brazilian party system is highly fragmented, and the composition of coalition gov-
ernments has constantly changed over time. In particular, the fragmentation of the party
system increased in the late 1980s, because of a new legislation easing the requirements
for party organization, and because of an exodus from the two largest parties at that time,
PMDB (Partido do Movimento Democr´ atico Brazileiro) and PFL (Partido da Frente Lib-
eral). Nowadays, there are 27 oﬃcially registered parties. Besides PMDB and PFL, PT
(Partido dos Trabalhadores) and PSDB (Partido da Social-Democracia Brasileira) are the
most important of them. The current President is Dilma Vana Rousseﬀ Linhares, elected
in October 2010 and aﬃliated with PT.13 After the 2010 parliamentary election, PT be-
13Oath of oﬃce always takes place in January of the year following the presidential election.
13came the largest party in the Congress, and it also rules some states and major cities. The
former Presidents were Luiz In´ acio Lula da Silva, also aﬃliated with PT, who was elected
in October 2002 and reelected in October 2006; and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, from
PSDB, who was elected in October 1994 and reelected in October 1998. PSDB rules the
two biggest Brazilian states, Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais. However, PMDB is the largest
party measured by number of aﬃliates and by number of mayors, and it was the largest
party measured by parliamentary seats over our sample period. Because of its relevance
and median position in the ideological spectrum, PMDB usually supports the government;
indeed, it is a member of the current government coalition and it was so in both Cardoso’s
mandates and in the second of Lula’s mandates. Among the main parties, PFL is the
more right-oriented and is concentrated in the Northeast of Brazil. Note that our sample
encompasses part of both Cardoso’s and Lula’s tenure in oﬃce.
Brazil has a weakly institutionalized party system, with high electoral volatility, low
levels of party identiﬁcation in the electorate, high fragmentation, and lack of strong
ideological platforms. Following the Constitution of 1988, however, all Presidents have
been able to build reasonably stable post-electoral government coalitions by means of
several discipline devices, such as veto power on the main issues, special prerogatives on
budget allocation—including federal transfers—and the strong power of the leaderships of
the coalition parties (see Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000; Pereira and Mueller, 2002).
3.2 The allocation of federal transfers
The resources of Brazilian municipalities come from (i) local revenues, such as ﬁnes, ex-
emptions, service taxes, and residential property taxes; and (ii) transfers from the federal,
state, or other municipal governments. The most important source of municipal revenues
is represented by federal transfers, which on average amount to 65% of the municipal
budget. Basically, there are two types of federal transfers: (i) Constitutional automatic
transfers, mostly unrestricted (Fundo de Participacao do Municipios, FPM) or tied to
education and health programs; and (ii) discretionary transfers (CONVˆ ENIO), mostly re-
lated to infrastructure projects. Excluding some big cities, such as Brazilian state capitals,
municipal governments are strongly dependent on these transfers for their budget, as tax
revenues average to only 5.5% of municipal total revenues.
14In this study, we focus on discretionary federal transfers devoted to infrastructure
projects, which amount to about 15% of total municipal expenditure in infrastructures.
These transfers are related to budget items that involve the construction of buildings and
bridges, the paving of roads, the improvement of water and sewer systems, the purchase of
ambulances, and so on. We focus on this type of federal transfers because the bulk of the
other revenues are largely non-discretionary and hard to manipulate.14 Furthermore, such
transfers are used to ﬁnance highly visible projects, that is, they are an ideal target for
politicians willing to tease voters. Although mayors have to exert some eﬀort in applying
for these discretionary transfers, the legislative and the executive have an important role
in deﬁning their precise allocation. The support of a federal deputy and the ﬁnal consent
of the President are crucial ingredients of the allocation mechanism.
Basically, the annual budget law (Lei Or¸ cament´ aria Anual) is ﬁrst drafted by the
executive, and it is then subject to (individual or collective) amendments by legislators.
In most cases, the municipalities that will receive discretionary transfers are chosen by
legislators trying to bring the pork home, as the bulk of the proposed amendments include
targeted beneﬁts to local areas. There are limits, however, to the number and value of
the amendments that can be proposed by legislators. The Budget Committee is in charge
of authorizing the bill. After a period of discussion, Congress votes for the budget law,
which is then sent back to the President for the ﬁnal decision. As the budget law is not
mandatory in Brazil, the President has a major role in deciding the exact allocation of
the discretionary transfers and can thus use them to make deputies follow the guidelines
of the government coalition. Municipal governments must also exert some eﬀort to receive
these transfers, because a budgetary amendment can be executed only when an agreement
between the municipality and the central government is signed.
At the end of the day, voters in a given municipality will receive discretionary infrastruc-
ture transfers depending on three factors: (i) The eﬀort of their municipal administration;
(ii) the interest of a federal deputy; and (iii) the interest of the President in executing
the budget amendment (i.e., send the money exactly to that municipality). The federal
President has the last word in the decision process, though. Because of the institutional
14As a falsiﬁcation test, we also performed RDD estimations on Constitutional automatic transfers
(FPM), detecting no eﬀect of political alignment on their allocation (results available upon request).
15and political context described in the previous section, the President usually faces the
hard task of passing the legislative agenda in a Congress where there are a lot of parties,
and where the President’s party usually controls less than 20 percent of the seats. Discre-
tionary transfers to speciﬁc areas are therefore one of the instruments that the President
can use to unify the government coalition in the Congress.
3.3 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
Every two years there are elections in Brazil. Federal elections and municipal elections
take place separately; their exact timing over our sample period is illustrated in Figure 2.
Our study encompasses federal governments in oﬃce during the three four-year mandates
from 1999 to 2002, from 2003 to 2006, and from 2007 to 2010; as well as municipal ad-
ministrations in oﬃce during the three four-year mandates from 1997 to 2000, from 2001
to 2004, and from 2005 to 2008. Our baseline results consider federal transfers only in the
last two years of each mayoral mandate, that is, the per-capita amount of infrastructure
transfers for the periods 1999–2000, 2003–2004, and 2007–2008. For transfers in 1999 and
2000, the President was Fernando Henrique Cardoso , while for transfers since 2003 the
President was Luis In´ acio Lula da Silva. The choice of the timing is motivated by the
fact that we want to capture opportunistic transfers in proximity of upcoming municipal
elections. As a second step, however, we also check whether opportunistic transfers take
place in proximity of federal rather than municipal elections. We thus build an alterna-
tive measure of federal transfers, referring to the ﬁrst two years (last two years) of each
municipal (federal) mandate: 1997–1998, 2001–2002, and 2005–06. In our data, federal
transfers are measured in per-capita real values expressed in 2000 Brazilian reais.
As for the treatment, we deﬁne two diﬀerent variables capturing whether the munici-
pality is politically aligned with the federal President or not. The ﬁrst measure indicates if
the mayor belongs to a party in the federal government coalition, and the second measure
indicates if the mayor belongs to the President’s party. In Table 1, we provide details on
the political parties included in the federal government coalition year by year.
In order to implement our identiﬁcation strategy in the Brazilian multi-party system
along the lines discussed in Section 2.2, we must restrict our sample to municipalities
where only two (or at most three) candidates ran for mayor and one of them was politically
16aligned with the federal President. This is due to the fact that the assignment to political
alignment can be considered as good as random only if the mayoral candidate aligned with
the President had a fair chance of winning the election.
This sample selection procedure improves internal validity, but it comes at the price of
lower external validity. The races with only two candidates amount to 51% of the total,
while races with only three candidates amount to 31%, so that races with at most three
candidates represent 82% of all municipal elections. If we further restrict the sample to
elections where the aligned mayor belonged to the ﬁrst two (or three) candidates, we end
up with a sample of two-candidate races that covers 42% (19%) of the total when we
look at the President’s coalition (party). With three-candidate races, we end up with
a sample that covers 55% (28%) of the total when we look at the President’s coalition
(party). This means that, starting from the entire sample of 22,287 elections, we can
implement our RDD strategy in four distinct subsamples: (i) two-candidate races with at
least one candidate belonging to the President’s coalition (5,723); (ii) two-candidate races
with respect to the President’s party (2,612); (iii) three-candidate races with respect to
the coalition (12,245); (iv) three-candidate races with respect to the party (6,248).
To evaluate what we lose in terms of external validity with the RDD sample selection,
we can look at how the above subsamples diﬀer from the rest of Brazilian municipalities.15
Table 2 (Table 3) compares two-candidate (three-candidate) races with the other municipal
elections. The variables we consider are the following town-speciﬁc Census characteristics
(i.e., the covariates Wi): population size; per-capita income; the over-20 literacy rate; the
rate of urban population; the fraction of houses with access to water, sewer, or electricity;
the presence of a local radio station; and geographical location.
Looking at the President’s coalition, municipalities with two-candidate races are not
so diﬀerent from the rest, although they appear to be slightly smaller in terms of average
population and less likely to have a local radio station. Municipalities with three-candidate
races, despite their higher frequency, tend to be more diversiﬁed from the rest, as they
are not only bigger and with a radio station, but are also better endowed of public in-
frastructures (i.e., house access to water, sewer, electricity). Looking at the President’s
15In all speciﬁcations, we consider only municipalities with less than 200,000 inhabitants, where elections
are held under plurality rule.
17party—not surprisingly given the even lower sample size—diﬀerences are also stark, in
both two-candidate and three-candidate elections.
Furthermore, focusing on the RDD samples of two-candidate and three-candidate races,
we can preliminary check if there are statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between munic-
ipalities with a politically aligned mayor and municipalities with a politically unaligned
mayor. According to the summary statistics reported in Table 4 and Table 5, munici-
palities aligned with the President’s coalition (or the President’s party) tend to receive
larger per-capita transfers when municipal elections are approaching (that is, in the last
two years of the mayoral mandate), while no signiﬁcant diﬀerence emerges with respect
to ﬁrst two-year transfers. The reelection probability of aligned mayors also tend to be
considerably higher. Looking at the Census characteristics, there is no evidence of “se-
lection on observables” in our two samples. Indeed, there are no statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between aligned and unaligned municipalities, except for three-candidate races
with the President’s party as a measure of political alignment. This means that in gen-
eral municipalities that are politically aligned with the President do not seem to diﬀer
from the others in terms of wealth and development. This is not particularly relevant for
our identiﬁcation strategy—which accommodates for both selection on observables and
unobservables—but it is an additional piece of information on Brazilian politics.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 The eﬀect of political alignment on federal transfers
Our main results are reported in Table 6, which shows the benchmark OLS and diﬀ-in-diﬀ
estimates, and in Table 7, which shows the RDD estimates. We look at two diﬀerent
outcomes: in the ﬁrst two columns of both tables, the dependent variable is the amount
of transfers in the last two years of the mayoral term (when the next municipal election is
approaching); in the last two columns, the dependent variable is the amount of transfers
in the ﬁrst two years of the mayoral term (when the next federal election is approaching).
For both dependent variables, we have two separate columns because, as discussed above,
we measure political alignment referring to both the President’s coalition and party. To
ease comparisons, we implement the OLS and diﬀ-in-diﬀ speciﬁcations both in the whole
18sample and in the RDD samples of two-candidate and three-candidate elections.
According to the cross-sectional and panel evidence reported in Table 6, politically
aligned municipalities receive more infrastructure transfers in the last two years of the
mayoral mandate, while the estimates on the transfers received in the ﬁrst two years are
never statistically signiﬁcant. The results of the OLS regressions in the all sample and in
two-candidate (or three-candidate) elections are fairly similar between each other, for both
measures of political alignment. This further reassures about the external validity of our
RDD sample restriction. For all municipalities (panel A), with respect to the average level,
transfers increase by 18.4% or 24.1% when the mayor belongs to the coalition or party of
the President, respectively. In two-candidate (panel B) and three-candidate races (panel
C), the OLS estimates point to a 27.3% (two-candidate) or 20.5%(three-candidate) eﬀect
of the coalition alignment, and to a 24.9% (two-candidate) or 35.8% (three-candidate)
eﬀect of the party alignment. The size of the diﬀ-in-diﬀ estimates is in the same ballpark,
with just one exception: in two-candidate races, being aligned with the President’s party
has an eﬀect on transfers that is almost twice as much as the other estimates (about 75%).
Diﬀ-in-diﬀ estimates also tend to be slightly larger than OLS. This discrepancy might be
due to the fact that OLS coeﬃcients display a downward bias. Yet, also the diﬀ-in-diﬀ
results may suﬀer from time-varying omitted bias.
Table 7 reports the main RDD results in (close) two-candidate and three-candidate
elections. In the two-candidate sample (panel A), according to the baseline estimation
with spline polynomial approximation and full bandwidth as in equation (8), being af-
ﬁliated with the coalition of the Brazilian President increases the amount of per-capita
infrastructure transfers by about 36.9%.16 The eﬀect of being aﬃliated with the Presi-
dent’s party is instead not statistically signiﬁcant. In the three-candidate sample (panel
B), being aﬃliated with the President’s coalition increases transfers by about 26.3%. The
eﬀect of being aﬃliated with the President’s party amounts to 34.3%, although it is sig-
niﬁcant only at a 10% level. The RDD results on the President’s coalition are a direct
conﬁrmation of Proposition 1 in our model. The fact that the results on the President’s
party are less robust could receive a twofold explanation: from a political point of view,
16We implement the spline polynomial approximation with a third-order polynomial, but the results
are robust to the use of a second-order or fourth-order polynomial (available upon request).
19the Brazilian President might be forced to please his political allies even more than his own
party, in order to keep the government coalition united (see the discussion in Section 3.2);
from a statistical point of view, as the point estimates on the President’s party are fairly
similar to those on the President’s coalition, the lower signiﬁcance might be a problem of
accuracy induced by the reduced sample size.
In Table 7, we also implement local linear regression with optimal bandwidth as in
equation (9). According to these estimates, being aﬃliated with the President’s coalition
in close races entails an increase in per-capita infrastructure transfers by 40.7% (two-
candidate) or by 32.9% (three-candidate). The estimates on the President’s party are
never statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, the size of the eﬀect of political alignment in the
RDD estimations is somehow larger than the eﬀect in the OLS or diﬀ-in-diﬀ estimations.
Also this result could receive a twofold explanation: on the one hand, the RDD setup
controls for unobservables removing omitted bias; on the other hand, the RDD eﬀect is
identiﬁed for close electoral races only, where the impact of political alignment might be
higher because of tactical motivations, as predicted by our model.
Table 7 also conﬁrms the OLS and diﬀ-in-diﬀ evidence on the per-capita infrastructure
transfers received from the federal government in the ﬁrst two years of the municipal man-
date (when the federal elections are approaching). There is no evidence of opportunistic
transfers in proximity of federal elections. This result highlights a clear political budget
cycle in federal transfers to municipal governments with respect to the timing of munic-
ipal elections. And it also reinforces the idea that mayors can claim the lion’s share of
the political credit from larger transfers (i.e., that the parameter θ in our model is greater
than zero), because tactical redistribution takes place only in proximity of the elections
for mayor and not of the elections for the Brazilian President.
Figure 3 shows the estimated spline polynomials in MV Pim to highlight not only the
jump in federal transfers at MV Pim = 0, but also the shape of the relationship between
federal transfers and political competition for aligned municipalities (on the right of the
zero threshold) and unaligned municipalities (on the left of the zero threshold). This is
a way to indirectly assess Proposition 2 in our model. With respect to the President’s
coalition, Figure 3 clearly shows that the RDD estimate is driven by a sizable cut in
transfers to unaligned municipalities close to the zero threshold. In other words, the central
20government penalizes municipalities ruled by mayors belonging to the opposition coalition,
especially if they won by a narrow margin, thereby tying the hands of its (political)
enemies for the next electoral race. This evidence on the left of zero is consistent with
the theoretical prediction in Proposition 2. But the evidence on the right of zero does not
show a stark increase in transfers to aligned municipalities that won by a narrow margin.
On the contrary, there is some evidence that the federal government gives more money to
its strongholds (where MV Pim is positive and very high), although we do not know if this
is driven by the (endogenous) local characteristics of these municipalities or by political
motivations (as predicted by Cox and McCubbins, 1986). In addition, note that the tails
of both polynomials are not accurately estimated because of the small sample size.
Our model assumes that federal transfers improve the reelection prospects of the in-
cumbent, as long as there are political credit spillovers. The eﬀect of transfers on electoral
outcomes has been estimated by others using Brazilian data (e.g., Brollo et al., 2010;
Litschig and Morrison, 2010) and our framework does not allow us to credibly identify
it. But it is still interesting to identify the eﬀect of political alignment per se on the
future reelection of the incumbent political party. Keeping in mind, of course, that this
diﬀerential incumbency advantage (if any) might be driven by many factors, beyond the
amount of politically motivated transfers received by the municipality in the last two years
of the mandate. For instance, a positive impact of political alignment on reelection might
capture a “bandwagon” eﬀect on the side of voters and interest groups, prone to support
politicians connected with the national leader who won the last presidential election. In
the ﬁrst two columns of Table 8, we repeat our RDD estimations with the incumbent
party’s reelection as dependent variable. Being aligned with the party of the President in-
creases reelection chances either by 27.2% (two-candidate) or by 23.5% (three-candidate).
Being aligned with the government coalition has either no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
(two-candidate) or increases reelection chances by 19.8%. These results, however, are not
robust to the use of local linear regression as estimation method.
Our model also assumes that aligned mayors are a valuable asset for the President.
This could be due to electoral advantages (if mayors were instrumental to ﬁnd votes for
the aligned presidential candidate), rent-seeking, or simple policy congruence. To assess
the plausibility of the ﬁrst channel, in the last two columns of Table 8, we repeat our RDD
21estimations with the municipal vote share of the Brazilian President (or the candidate of
the same party) in the future presidential election as dependent variable. The baseline
estimates with spline polynomial approximation point to a gain of about 2 (coalition) or
3 (party) percentage points for presidential candidates who can count on aligned mayors
at the municipal level. Yet, results are not robust to three-candidate races or the use of
local linear regression. There is some evidence, however, that at least part of the political
capital associated with aligned mayors might come from electoral advantages.
4.2 Treatment eﬀect heterogeneity
In Table 9 and Table 10, we estimate equation (10) to assess heterogeneity (if any) in
the treatment eﬀect. This a way to evaluate the comparative statics implications of our
model. We consider two dimensions: (i) whether the value of political capital for the
central government is high or not; and (ii) whether the transfers are expected to have
a strong impact on the electoral outcome or not.17 As empirical proxies for the ﬁrst
dimension, we use two measures: (i) the population size of the municipality; (ii) whether
there is a local radio station or not. The intuition behind these measures is that in small
municipalities or in municipalities without radio station local politicians have a strong role
in inﬂuencing the public opinion, and are therefore valuable allies for the President.18
The estimation results in Table 9 conﬁrm the theoretical predictions. There, we can see
that the eﬀect of political alignment on federal transfers is much stronger in municipalities
without a local radio station and in small municipalities (i.e., with a population size below
the median).19 As a matter of fact, in both two-candidate and three-candidate races,
political alignment almost doubles the amount of equilibrium transfers in municipalities
without a radio station and in municipalities with below-median population, while the
eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant in the others.
As empirical proxies for the second heterogeneity dimension, we use three measures: (i)
whether the incumbent mayor is allowed to run for reelection or faces a binding term limit;
17Unfortunately, we do not have a good proxy for electoral uncertainty in our data, so that we can only
test the above two comparative statics results.
18Ferraz and Finan (2011) use random corruption audit reports to show that political accountability is
lower in municipalities without a local radio station.
19The results on population size are robust to the estimation of a continuous version of equation (10),
with the exact number of resident inhabitants in the place of Dim (available upon request).
22(ii) whether the incumbent mayor is aligned with the state governor or not; (iii) whether
the turnout in municipal elections is high or low (based on the median turnout in the last
municipal election). Here, the idea is that mayors who can run for reelection, or may have
a hard time obtaining discretionary resources from other sources, are going to put more
eﬀort in using the additional revenues for political purposes.20 Moreover, irrespective of
the mayor’s eﬀort, increased municipal revenues can be expected to be more eﬀective in
terms of electoral outcomes where turnout is high.
The estimation results in Table 10 conﬁrm the theoretical predictions. The eﬀect of
political alignment on transfers is much higher for ﬁrst-term mayors, for mayors unaligned
with the state governor, and in municipalities characterized by high turnout in the last
municipal election. In two-candidate races, for mayors who can run for reelection and in
municipalities with above-median turnout, political alignment almost doubles the amount
of transfers; for mayors who cannot count on the support of the state governor, the increase
in transfers induced by political alignment is equal to about one-third. The eﬀect is instead
not statistically signiﬁcant in the other municipalities.
4.3 Validity tests
In order for our RDD econometric strategy to be internally valid, as discussed in Section
2.2, political parties must not be able to sort above the threshold of zero margin of victory.
In other words, political parties, even when they control the federal government, should
not be able to manipulate electoral outcomes in close elections. To check for the absence
of manipulative sorting, we perform: (i) visual inspection of the histograms of MV Pim in
Figure 4; and (ii) formal tests of the continuity of the density at MV Pim = 0, in the spirit
of McCrary (2008), in Figure 5. The latter procedure tests the null hypothesis of continuity
of the density of the margin of victory at the zero threshold, and it is implemented by
running kernel local linear regressions of the log of the density separately on both sides
of zero. None of these procedures shows any evidence of manipulative sorting around the
zero threshold. This means that (ex-post) close races are really decided by random shocks,
rather than choice variables such as federal transfers or campaigning eﬀort and ability.
20Consistently with this conjecture, De Janvry, Finan, and Sadoulet (2009) ﬁnd that the performance
of a cash transfer program intended to reduce school dropout is improved in municipalities where mayors
can be reelected. And mayors with good program performance are more likely to get reelected.
23In Table 11, we further check for discontinuities of the 2000 Census variables and ge-
ographic location at the zero threshold by implementing a set of balance tests, which are
performed estimating equation (8) with the town-speciﬁc characteristics Wi as dependent
variables. As these variables are predetermined with respect to the treatment (politi-
cal alignment), we should observe no discontinuity, as long as there is no manipulative
sorting around the zero threshold. This is indeed the case, as all of the variables are
balanced around the threshold, excluding a few exceptions for geographical variables in
three-candidate races with respect to the President’s party.
Finally, in the spirit of Imbens and Lemieux (2008), in Table 12 we implement placebo
tests by estimating the treatment eﬀect at fake thresholds, where there should be no
eﬀect. In particular, we look at the median on the left and on the right of the threshold
of zero margin of victory. We then estimate the treatment eﬀect on the outcome variables
for which we have signiﬁcant baseline results (last two-year transfers, incumbent party’s
reelection, and President’s vote share) using the spline polynomial approximation.21 With
only one exception, probably due to sample noise, the eﬀects at the fake thresholds are
never statistically diﬀerent from zero.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we document the existence of (sizable) tactical motivations in the allo-
cation of federal transfers by the Brazilian government, aimed at penalizing unaligned
municipalities where mayors belonging to the opposition coalition won by a narrow mar-
gin. Our RDD estimates—which accommodate for the presence of both time-invariant and
time-varying confounding factors—show that mayors politically aligned with the Brazilian
President receive larger federal transfers in (ex-ante) close races, by an amount that varies
from 26% to 41% according to the used estimation method or the measure of political
alignment. The results are statistically signiﬁcant only for federal transfers received in the
last two years of the mayoral term (pointing to the existence of a relevant political budget
cycle in Brazilian municipal revenues) and for federal transfers in infrastructure (which
are highly discretionary and linked to projects that are visible to voters). The normative
21Placebo estimates for ﬁrst two-year transfers are also never statistically diﬀerent from zero (available
upon request).
24implications of our empirical ﬁndings call for a ﬁnancing system of infrastructure projects
that should emphasize the ﬁscal responsibility of local governments, rather than central
transfers, which appear to be strongly inﬂuenced by political considerations.
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28Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Deﬁne τ = E[τ | Pi = 0,MV P 0
i = 0] = limMV P0
i ↑0 τi as the optimal transfers to unaligned
municipalities in close races, and τ = E[τ | Pi = 1,MV P 0
i = 0] = limMV P0
i ↓0 τi as the
optimal transfers to aligned municipalities in close races. These quantities are derived from




σ ]−C0(τ) = 0;




σ ] − C0(τ) = 0. It follows that: τ = τ∗ − z < τ∗ < τ = τ∗ + k,
with z,k > 0, which proves Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Deﬁne the ﬁrst-order condition in equation (4) as g(τi,MV P 0
i ) = 0. Therefore, at Pi = 1:
(∂τi/∂MV P 0
i ) = −(∂g/∂MV P 0
i )/(∂g/∂τi) < 0. In fact: (∂g/∂τi) < 0 because of the
second-order condition; and (∂g/∂MV P 0








σ ] < 0, as
φ0[x] = −xφ[x]. Similarly, at Pi = 0: (∂τi/∂MV P 0
i ) = −(∂g/∂MV P 0
i )/(∂g/∂τi) < 0,









σ ] < 0.
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Figure 1 – Politically motivated transfers
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Notes. Politically motivated transfers as a function of the past margin of victory of the candidate aligned with the President.
30Figure 2 – Timing of Brazilian elections




Notes. Timing of federal and municipal elections over the sample period.
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Notes. The central line is a split 3rd-order polynomial in the margin of victory of the President’s coalition or the President’s
party, ﬁtted over the interval [−0.80,+0.80]; the lateral lines represent the 95% conﬁdence interval. Scatter points are averaged
over 5-unit intervals. Two-candidate (Three-candidate) races are those where only two (three) candidates run for mayor and
one of them is aﬃliated with the President’s coalition or party.
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Notes. Frequency of municipalities according to the margin of victory of the President’s coalition or the President’s party.
Two-candidate (Three-candidate) races are those where only two (three) candidates run for mayor and one of them is aﬃliated
with the President’s coalition or party.
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President’s Party (Three−Candidate)
Notes. Weighted kernel estimation of the log density according to the margin of victory of the President’s coalition or the
President’s party, performed separately on either side of the zero threshold. Optimal binwidth and binsize as in McCrary
(2008). Two-candidate (Three-candidate) races are those where only two (three) candidates run for mayor and one of them is

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 6 – The impact of political alignment on federal transfers, OLS and diﬀ-in-diﬀ
Last two-year First two-year
transfers transfers
President’s President’s President’s President’s
Coalition Party Coalition Party
Panel A: All races
OLS 3.070**** 4.181**** 1.205 1.205
(0.815) (1.317) (1.756) (1.361)
Diﬀ-in-diﬀ 4.197*** 4.197*** -0.119 -0.086
(1.086) (1.742) (1.998) (3.222)
Obs. 22,287 22,287 22,178 22,178
Panel B: Two-candidate races
OLS 5.027*** 5.169** -0.902 -3.611
(1.530) (2.443) (2.092) (3.815)
Diﬀ-in-diﬀ 7.353*** 15.602*** -5.228 -1.482
(2.339) (4.071) (4.174) (8.081)
Obs. 5,723 2,612 5,606 2,506
Panel C: Three-candidate races
OLS 3.214*** 5.799*** 1.763 0.716
(1.108) (1.498) (1.943) (1.664)
Diﬀ-in-diﬀ 3.850*** 6.245*** -2.013 -1.738
(0.967) (1.752) (2.590) (2.919)
Obs. 12,245 6,248 12,032 6,061
Notes. Dependent variables: Last two-year transfers, i.e., the average infrastructure transfers from the federal government
to municipalities in the last two years of the mayoral term; First two-year transfers, i.e., the average infrastructure transfers
from the federal government to municipalities in the ﬁrst two years of the mayoral term (per-capita real values in 2000
Brazilian reais). Two-candidate (Three-candidate) races are those where only two (three) candidates run for mayor and one
of them is aﬃliated with the President’s coalition or party. OLS and diﬀ-in-diﬀ speciﬁcations as in equation (5) and (6),
respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
40Table 7 – The impact of political alignment on federal transfers, RDD estimates
Last two-year First two-year
transfers transfers
President’s President’s President’s President’s
Coalition Party Coalition Party
Panel A: Two-candidate races
Spline polynomial 6.789** 7.694 -1.756 -0.739
(3.095) (5.314) (4.442) (6.883)
Obs. 5,723 2,612 5,606 2,506
Local linear regression 7.477** 6.155 -2.609 6.048
(3.150) (5.221) (4.220) (6.302)
Optimal h 25 11 25 11
Obs. 4,430 1,188 4,329 1,133
Panel B: Three-candidate races
Spline polynomial 4.134** 5.550* -2.403 -1.700
(2.085) (3.225) (2.723) (4.540)
Obs. 12,245 6,248 12,032 6,061
Local linear regression 5.170*** 4.453 -1.645 0.876
(1.991) (3.519) (2.725) (3.634)
Optimal h 22 11 22 11
Obs. 7,248 1,948 7,120 1,878
Notes. Dependent variables: Last two-year transfers, i.e., the average infrastructure transfers from the federal government to
municipalities in the last two years of the mayoral term; First two-year transfers, i.e., the average infrastructure transfers from
the federal government to municipalities in the ﬁrst two years of the mayoral term (per-capita real values in 2000 Brazilian
reais). Two-candidate (Three-candidate) races are those where only two (three) candidates run for mayor and one of them is
aﬃliated with the President’s coalition or party. RDD speciﬁcations with spline polynomial and local linear regression as in
equation (8) and (9), respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance
at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
41Table 8 – The impact of political alignment on electoral outcomes, RDD estimates
Incumbent party’s reelection President’s vote share
President’s President’s President’s President’s
Coalition Party Coalition Party
Panel A: Two-candidate races
Spline polynomial 0.051 0.091* 0.019* 0.029*
(0.033) (0.051) (0.011) (0.017)
Obs. 5,723 2,612 5,723 2,612
Local linear regression -0.073 0.042 0.037 -0.043
(0.082) (0.114) (0.025) (0.041)
Optimal h 08 11 12 11
Obs. 1,986 1,188 2,853 1,188
Panel B: Three-candidate races
Spline polynomial 0.067*** 0.079** 0.002 0.013
(0.025) (0.038) (0.008) (0.013)
Obs. 12,245 6,248 12,245 6,248
Local linear regression 0.031 0.077 -0.006 -0.016
(0.061) (0.084) (0.016) (0.024)
Optimal h 08 11 18 17
Obs. 3,397 1,948 6,183 2,833
Notes. Dependent variables: Incumbent party’s reelection, i.e., the probability that the mayor’s political party wins the next
election; President’s vote share, i.e., the incumbent President’s vote share in a given municipality at the next presidential
election. Two-candidate (Three-candidate) races are those where only two (three) candidates run for mayor and one of them
is aﬃliated with the President’s coalition or party. RDD speciﬁcations with spline polynomial and local linear regression as in
equation (8) and (9), respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance
at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
42Table 9 – Last two-year transfers and political capital, RDD heterogeneity
Two-candidate races Three-candidate races
President’s President’s President’s President’s
Coalition Party Coalition Party
Panel A: Municipalities without vs. with radio
Without radio 9.027** 8.096 5.378** 5.530
(3.606) (6.082) (2.561) (3.938)
With radio -5.318 2.224 -0.089 3.090
(3.929) (5.041) (2.248) (3.330)
Diﬀerence -14.345*** -5.872 -5.467 -2.440
5.536) (7.843) (3.480) (5.110)
Obs. 5,723 2,612 12,245 6,248
Panel B: Small vs. large municipalities
Small 11.337*** 6.897 8.199** 8.965*
(4.632) (6.854) (3.519) (5.032)
Large -1.136 8.919 0.246 2.103
(3.411) (7.206) (1.890) (2.878)
Diﬀerence -12.473** 2.022 -7.953** -6.862
(5.925) (9.654) (4.011) (5.613)
Obs. 5,723 2,612 12,245 6,248
Notes. Dependent variable: Last two-year transfers, i.e., the average infrastructure transfers from the federal government to
municipalities in the last two years of the mayoral term (per-capita real values in 2000 Brazilian reais). Panel A compares
municipalities without and with a radio station. Panel B compares municipalities below and above the median population.
Panel C compares municipalities where the President obtained more than the median vote share in the past presidential
election (President’s strongholds) versus the others (opposition strongholds). RDD speciﬁcations with spline polynomial
in diﬀerent subsamples as in equation (10). Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
43Table 10 – Last two-year transfers and eﬀectiveness, RDD heterogeneity
Two-candidate races Three-candidate races
President’s President’s President’s President’s
Coalition Party Coalition Party
Panel A: First vs. second term
First term 9.460*** 10.901* 5.247** 7.786**
(3.653) (6.217) (2.555) (3.925)
Second term 0.688 1.415 1.312 0.081
(5.886) (9.163) (12.765) (5.488)
Diﬀerence -8.772 -9.486 -3.935 -7.705
(6.946) (10.707) (4.369) (6.580)
Obs. 5,723 2,612 12,245 6,248
Panel B: Unaligned vs. aligned governor
Unaligned governor 6.950** 12.929* 4.851** 9.627**
(3.412) (7.041) (2.250) (4.307)
Aligned governor 5.818 -0.447 -0.892 -3.967
(7.999) (1.879) (5.607) (3.181)
Diﬀerence -1.132 -13.376* -5.743 -13.594**
(8.678) (8.039) (6.050) (5.290)
Obs. 5,723 2,612 12,245 6,248
Panel C: Low vs. high municipal turnout
Low turnout -0.103 5.062 0.825 -0.157
(3.230) (6.652) (2.136) (4.186)
High turnout 9.037** 7.925 5.445 7.147*
(4.131) (6.330) (3.497) (4.113)
Diﬀerence 9.140* 2.862 6.386 7.304
(5.173) (8.920) (4.176) (5.743)
Obs. 5,723 2,612 12,245 6,248
Notes. Dependent variable: Last two-year transfers, i.e., the average infrastructure transfers from the federal government to
municipalities in the last two years of the mayoral term (per-capita real values in 2000 Brazilian reais). Panel A compares
ﬁrst-term and second-term mayors, where the latter face a binding term limit. Panel B compares states where the governor
is unaligned and aligned with the President. Panel C compares municipalities with turnout below and above the median
level at municipal elections. RDD speciﬁcations with spline polynomial in diﬀerent subsamples as in equation (10). Robust
standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at
the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
44Table 11 – Testing the continuity of town characteristics in close races
Two-candidate races Three-candidate races
President’s President’s President’s President’s
Coalition Party Coalition Party
Per-capita income 4.410 -5.589 4.930 3.798
(5.621) (7.456) (4.158) (6.573)
Population -615.864 -12.502 -380.774 2,605.870
(1,197.854) (1,866.301) (1,305.727) (2,235.925)
Urban -0.002 -0.007 -0.001 0.009
(0.017) (0.025) (0.013) (0.019)
Water -0.005 -0.021 0.005 -0.009
(0.018) (0.025) (0.013) (0.019)
Sewer 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.015) (0.023) (0.011) (0.017)
Electricity -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002
(0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010)
Literacy rate -0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.000
(0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006)
Radio 0.028 -0.051 0.019 -0.048
(0.031) (0.048) (0.027) (0.041)
North -0.020 0.035 0.012 0.044*
(0.017) (0.028) (0.015) (0.023)
Northeast 0.066 -0.065 -0.032 -0.095**
(0.041) (0.056) (0.030) (0.040)
Center 0.012 0.029 0.012 0.012
(0.021) (0.035) (0.016) (0.025)
South -0.016 0.048 -0.002 0.083**
(0.042) (0.057) (0.030) (0.041)
Southeast -0.042 -0.048 0.011 -0.043
(0.039) (0.062) (0.029) (0.047)
Obs. 5,723 2,612 12,245 6,248
Notes. Estimated discontinuities of town characteristics at the threshold of zero margin of victory. RDD speciﬁcations with
spline polynomial as in equation (8). Population is the number of inhabitants in 2000. Per-capita income refers to monthly
income in 2000 and is measured in Brazilian reais. The following variables refer to the 2000 Census and are expressed in
percentage terms: Urban population is the fraction of people living in urban areas; Literacy rate is the fraction of people
above 20 who are literate; Water access, Sewer, and Electricity are the fraction of houses with access to water supply,
sewer, and electricity, respectively; Radio captures whether there is at least one radio station in the municipality. North,
Northeast, Center, South, and Southeast are macro-regions. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are
in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
45Table 12 – Placebo tests at fake electoral thresholds
President’s President’s President’s President’s President’s President’s
Coalition Party Coalition Party Coalition Party
Panel A1: Median on the left, two-candidate races
Last two-year Incumbent party’s President’s
transfers reelection vote share
-9.186 -10.015 -0.050 0.051 -0.023 0.021
(7.614) (9.560) (0.144) (0.167) (0.042) (0.056)
Obs. 785 785 785 785 785 785
Panel A2: Median on the left, three-candidate races
Last two-year Incumbent party’s President’s
transfers reelection vote share
-2.340 -2.701 0.102 0.086 -0.015 0.017
(4.799) (8.691) (0.122) (0.123) (0.030) (0.043)
Obs. 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167
Panel B1: Median on the right, two-candidate races
Last two-year Incumbent party’s President’s
transfers reelection vote share
4.118 -1.200 0.049 -0.203 -0.009 -0.064**
(5.841) (10.198) (0.081) (0.135) (0.023) (0.033)
Obs. 2,711 1,214 2,711 1,214 2,711 1,214
Panel B2: Median on the right, three-candidate races
Last two-year Incumbent party’s President’s
transfers reelection vote share
-0.716 4.801 0.070 -0.158 -0.010 -0.026
(4.892) (6.932) (0.063) (0.105) (0.018) (0.025)
Obs. 4,444 1,943 4,444 1,943 4,444 1,943
Notes. Impact of political alignment at fake electoral threshold (i.e., median on the left and on the right of the true threshold
at zero). Dependent variables: Last two-year transfers, i.e., the average infrastructure transfers from the federal government
to municipalities in the last two years of the mayoral term (per-capita real values in 2000 Brazilian reais); Incumbent
party’s reelection, i.e., the probability that the mayor’s political party wins the next election; President’s vote share, i.e., the
incumbent President’s vote share in a given municipality at the next presidential election. Two-candidate (Three-candidate)
races are those where only two (three) candidates run for mayor and one of them is aﬃliated with the President’s coalition
or party. RDD speciﬁcations with spline polynomial as in equation (8). Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality
level are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
46